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One of the problems facing the cellulosic ethanol industry is the cellulose material supply. The 
U.S. forestlands have considerable potential to become one of the main sources of biomass to 
meet the 2022 renewable fuel target. Focusing on the land exiting the Conservation Reserve 
Program  (CRP),  the  article  finds  that  few  landowners  are  willing  to  convert  their  land  to 
forestland after the CRP contract is expired. Our econometric estimates show the choice decision 
is responsive to net returns of land use alternatives, especially cropland. Two policy initiatives 
are suggested to provide direct incentives for land use change. The nested logit estimates are 
used to simulate landowners‘ responses to policy mechanism. The results show that subsidies can 
substantially increase forestland, although a spillover effect exists.  
 
 






As the second-generation ethanol, cellulosic ethanol has been given high expectation of putting 
the growing biofuel industry on a sustainable basis. At present, one of the problems facing the 
cellulosic ethanol industry is the cellulose material supply. A wide array of cellulosic biomass 
includes agricultural residues like wheat straw, herbaceous energy crops like switch grass, short-
rotation woody crops like hybrid poplar and willow, and forest residues like thinnings from 
timberland. Among them, U.S. forestlands have considerable potential to become one of the 
main sources of biomass to meet the 2022 renewable fuel target (producing 20 billion gallons per 
year  (BGY)  of  second-generation  and  other  renewable  fuels).  Forestland  can  provide  two 
primary sources: residues from the harvesting and management of commercial timberlands for 
the extraction of sawlogs, pulpwood, veneer log, and other conventional products; and currently 
non-merchantable biomass associated with the standing forest inventory. It is projected that if 
forest  roadside  prices  range  from  roughly  $40  to  $46  per  dry  ton,  forestland  can  provide 
sufficient feedstock to produce 4 BGY of renewable fuels (Biomass Research and Development 
Board 2007).  
  Two  barriers  to  providing  sustainable  quantities  of  forest  biomass  that  have  been 
identified are the lack of biomass production capacity and the high relative costs of production, 
recovery, and transportation of feedstocks.  Production capacity relies on land availability, which 
is relatively constant in agriculture. Therefore, converting land into forestland is a feasible path 
to pursue to increase forest biomass supply. One important potential source of agricultural land is 
acreage exited the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP). Land use conversion from productive 
cropland to forestland would require a high threshold return, while current CRP land may be 
relatively easy to convert because the CRP lands are less productive marginal lands. 4 
 
The CRP, initiated by the Food Security Act of 1985, aims to reduce erosion, improve 
water  quality,  establish  wildlife  habitat,  and  provide  other  environmental  benefits  through 
retiring  highly  erodible  and  environmentally  sensitive  cropland  from  production  for  a  fixed 
duration of 10 or 15 years. During the contract period, farmland is converted or maintained in 
grass, trees, wildlife cover, or other conservation practices. As of April 2008, CRP enrollment 
stood at 34.7 million acres (USDA 2008). However, under the current contract terms, a large 
number of contracts will soon be expired. There are 3.8 million CRP acres scheduled to expire in 
September 2009. In the next three years, the expected expired CRP acres are more than 4 million 
acres per year (Figure 1)
1. The exiting land can become a potential pool to be flowing into 
forestland  under  appropriate incentives.  Thus  understanding  land -use  choice  upon  contract 
expiration is the key for developing suitable subsidy and tax policies to motivate forest biomass 
production.  
  There is a rich literature on land use change.  The relationship between land-use choices 
and relative returns from alternative uses is often estimated in econometric models. Multinomial-
choice model (Skaggs, Kirksey, and Harper 1994), logistic model (Janssen and Ghebremicael 
1994; Isik and Yang 2004; Lubowski, Plantinga, and Stavins 2008), and ordered probit model 
(Cooper and Osborn 1998) can be found in the literature. However,  specific studies on land use 
after exiting  the CRP are  rare. Roberts and Lubowski (2007) make use of observed land -use 
choices  following  expiration  of  CRP  contracts  between  1995  and  1997,  and  examine  the 
relationship between the landowner response and observable variables (changes in return  from 
land alternative uses).  The advantage of this study is to use parcel -level data rather than 
aggregate data as in many empirical land-use studies (Alig 1986; Plantinga 1996; Hardie and 
Parks 1996;  Miller and Plantinga 1999; Plantinga and Ahn 2002 )  to  estimate  landowners‘ 5 
 
response  to  determinants  of  land  use  choice  (including  quasi-rent,  land  characteristics,  and 
farmer  characteristics).  Robert  and  Lubowski  (2007)  regard  the  specification  of  quasi-rent 
function as a difficult empirical challenge in aggregate data because of broad cross-sectional 
variations in land characteristics. Problems of misspecification and omitted variables may result 
in  inconsistent  estimates.  Similarly,  in  this  study  we  adopt  parcel-specific  data  to  examine 
landowner decision after exiting the CRP.  
The research mainly aims to improve cellulosic forest biomass production by proposing 
and initiating policies which target CRP land conversion to forestland. Specification of discrete 
choice model is an issue even if data on parcel-level land characteristics are available. In this 
article, we propose a theoretical  model  of  landowner  choice  to  guide  empirical  econometric 
modeling. We model farmers‘ land use decision making and investigate the conditions under 
which land conversion to forestland is economically attractive for landowners. A nested logit 
specification is employed for the transition probabilities to relax the restriction of Independence 
of Irrelevant Alternatives in multinomial logit model. The results show the transition probability 
is  responsive  to  crop  net  return.  Other  majority  of  estimated  parameters  and  respective 
elasticities are found to be consistent with economic expectation.  
Based on econometric results, we simulate transition probabilities change to two policies: 
subsidizing conversion to forest and taxing land out of forest. Simulation results show landowner 
can quickly respond to the subsidy for forestland and convert cropland to pasture and forest, 
while the tax policy is not effective because of large conversion cost.  
 
An Optimal Control Model of Land Use 6 
 
We first construct an optimal control model of land use choice at the individual landowner level. 
Our focus is the land exiting the CRP. The landowner faces three choices: cropland, pasture, and 
forestland.    A  variety  of  economic  and  hydrologic  factors  relevant  to  decision  making  are 
observed. Typically, landowners observe agricultural prices and production costs, agricultural 
yields in their area, typical timber returns, grazing rate, land quality, and land cover practices in 
the CRP (Stavins and Jaffe 1990). Based on this information, the landowner makes the decision 
of whether to keep land in the original cover in the CRP (pasture or forest) or convert to cropland. 
A risk-neutral landowner will seek to maximize the present value of the stream of expected 
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Where i indexes counties, j indexes individual land parcels, t indexes time，  indexes the 
original CRP cover prior to exit
2; uppercase letters are stock variables; and lowercase letters are 
flow variables. 
These variables are: 7 
 
  ) , ( q p A
a
it = the present value of expected agricultural revenue less  variable cost per acre in 
county i; 
a
it p  is the price vector faced by landowners at time t for crop outputs and non-land 
inputs. q is land quality;  ) , ( q p A
a
it is a monotonic function of q. 
ijt g =acres of land converted from the CRP to cropland; 
) , ( q p B
b
t = the present value of expected pasture
3 revenue less  variable cost per acre in county i 
and time t; 
a
it p  is the price vector faced by landowners at time t for forage outputs and non-land 
inputs;  ) , ( q p B
b
t is also a monotonic function of q. 
ijt v = acres of land converted from the CRP to pasture; 
g
it C =average cost of conversion from the CRP to cropland per acre; 
v
it C = average cost of conversion from the CRP to pasture per acres;  
ijt S =stock (acres) of the original CRP; 
c
it f =expected average annual net income from stock land per acre which depends on the cover 
practices (if forest, it is annuity of stumpage value; if pasture, it is forage return or grazing rate); 
ijt g , ijt v =maximum feasible rate of conversion resulted from institutional or other considerations, 
e.g., available labor or capital. These are the bounds of conversion land.  
The user will determine conversion rates,  ijt g , ijt v , based on the current-value Hamiltonian,  
) (q H . 
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where   ) (q t   is the undiscounted opportunity value to the landowner of an additional acre of 
forestland at time t. The optimal conversion rate is derived from the first order conditions: 
  ) ( ) , (
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Arbitrary condition is  
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Since the objective is linear in  ijt g  and  jit v , the optimal conversion rule under the application of 
control theoretical methods is:  
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The rule implies that a parcel in the CRP should be converted to other alternative use if the 
present  value  of  expected  profit  less  conversion  cost  is  the  highest  among  all  alternatives. 
Otherwise, it will keep the same cover as in the CRP. 
 
 
Nested Logistic Model 9 
 
 
The  landowner‘s  profit  components  are  not  always  observable  for  econometricians.  Specific 
distribution  assumptions  on  the  structure  of  the  unobserved  components  yield  alternative 
specifications of discrete choice models. In general, discrete choice decision can be done with 
the multinomianl logit model (MNL), but the MNL assumes proportional substitution patterns 
(Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives), which means the ratio of the probabilities of any two 
alternatives is independent of the presence or absence of other alternatives in the model. This 
assumption  is  not  realistic  because  of  correlations  among  alternatives.  To  overcome  the 
shortcoming,  various  extensions  of  the  MNL  exist  that  relax  the  restrictive  substitution 
assumption and allow correlations between the alternatives‘ error terms. The nested logit model 
partially relaxes the assumption. It groups similar or close alternatives into nests and assumes 
that the error terms of alternatives within a nest are correlated while error terms of alternatives in 
different nests are uncorrelated (Train 2003).  
A two-level nested logit model is proposed in the article. Suppose a parcel, labeled j, 
faces a choice among K agricultural management alternatives. We define,  , the landowner‘s 
benefit  from  allocating  j  in  use  k.  The  random  benefit  is  the  sum  of  a  marginal  benefit 
component   from the nest   and a conditional benefit component,   , which both consist 
of a deterministic part   and a random part  . 
 
Under the assumption of specific distribution of error terms, the probability of choosing 
alternative k that is grouped in m,  , can be expressed as the product of the marginal choice 
probability   for nest m (top level) and the conditional choice probability   for alternative j 
within nest m (bottom level). 10 
 
 
where  is the inclusive value as the expected benefits of nest m connecting the two decision 
levels.  
Land  use  is  easier  to  substitute  each  other  when  they  have  similar  land  quality 
requirement.  Based  on  this,  two-level  nesting  structure  is  established  by  two  land  quality 
measures—the  land  capability  class  &  subclass  (LCC)  and  Universal  Soil  Loss  Equation 
(USLE)
4 slope percent (Slope). The LCC is the soil suitability rating for agriculture, between 1 
and 8— the class 1 soil has a few restrictions that limit its use, the class 8 soil has limitations that 
nearly  preclude  its  use  for  commercial  crop  production.  Slope  percent  is  a  critical  index 
determining  soil  erodibility,  which  has  also  been  tied  to  crop  production  costs  through 
conservation compliance provisions required of farmers receiving farm program assistance. In 
general, land in crops has the highest average land quality while pasture and forest appear to 
have more similar land quality requirement. We incorporate these differences in land quality 
requirements  by  specifying  our  nested  logit  model  with  two  nests:  ,  and 
.  
Following Lubowski et al. (2006) specification, conditional benefit component that is 
unique to each alternative k is specified as 
 
 
where   is an alternative-specific intercept,  is the net return to land alternative k in county c, 
 is  the  original  cover  practices  in  the  CRP,  and   is  the  error  term.  The  term, 11 
 
, is used to model land conversion cost because the cost 
data are not available and we expect costs may be closely related to land quality and cover 
practices.  The  terms,  and   are  to  capture  the  parcel-level 
variation of land returns in one county because we only observe county level average returns 
rather than parcel-specific net returns.  
Similarly, for the marginal benefit component that is common across the alternatives 
within  each  nest,  we  include  a  constant  term  and  three  variables  representing  land  quality 
measures and cover.  
 
Where  is a constant specific to nest  .  
 
Data  
A primary parcel-specific data source for the CRP is the Natural Resource Inventory (NRI), 
which  is  conducted  by  the  Natural  Resource  Conservation  Service  (NRCS).  The  NRI  is  a 
scientifically-designed,  longitudinal  panel  survey  of  the  nation‘s  soil,  water,  and  related 
resources designed to assess conditions and trends every five years. The 1997 NRI contains data 
on nonfederal lands and water areas within the 48 conterminous United States, Hawaii, Puerto 
Rico,  and  the  U.S.  Virgin  Islands.  The  1997  NRI  provides  information  on  land  use,  land 
characteristics, and conservation practices for about 80000 points in four intervals – 1982, 1987, 
1992, and 1997. Each NRI point represents a different land area according to an acreage weight 
(expansion factor). The total CRP acreage in one county or region can be calculated by summing 
the expansion factor for all sites enrolled in the CRP. 12 
 
   Our analysis uses the set of points from the NRI enrolled in the CRP in 1992 and not 
enrolled in 1997. The period from 1992 to 1997 covers the expiration of contracts from the first 
five CRP sign-ups, conducted from 1985 through 1987( Robert and Lubowski 2007). During the 
period, 2576 sites representing 3,577,200 acres exit the CRP.  According to land cover categories, 
Table 1 provides the distribution of points and acres.  
<Table2> 
Table 2 reports 1997 land use for parcels under different covers that exits CRP between 
1992 and 1997. Of acres exiting the CRP, 62.92% returned to crop production by 1997, 22.27% 
were converted into pastureland, 8.31% into rangeland, 1.35% into other use, and only less than 
6% into forestland. The data also show that if the parcel did not return to crop production, they in 
general continue under ground cover similar to that contracted for under the CRP. 
<Table 3> 
<Tables 4> 
In Table 3, we report summary statistics of land quality index—LCC and Slope—and 
original  cover  practices  according  to  land  use  categories.  Surprisingly,  the  average  LCC  of 
forestland is lowest among them, which means forestland have the highest land quality. This is 
not consistent with expectation because the majority of forests are always standing at marginal 
land. The reason is that the forestland sample is not enough or not representative. LCC only 
embodies  partial  information  to  land  quality.  The  similar  situation  is  found  for  Slope  that 
forestland has the lowest slope percentage. Land converted to forestland in general is covered by 
forest or wildlife habitat before exiting the CRP while land to cropland and pasture is covered by 
grasses or legumes. Table 4 provides summary statistics of net returns to three alternative uses in 
1997. Only county-level data are  available. The procedure of data estimate can be found in 13 
 
Appendix A. Data show that net crop return is higher as compared to lands that exit but were not 
converted to crops.  
 
Estimation Results 
We employ maximum likelihood methods to estimate the parameters of the model of transitions 
to these three uses (crop, pasture and forest) using observations of land with different covers 
exiting between 1992 and 1997. Estimated parameters for the nested logit model are reported in 
Table 5. The results are basically consistent with the expected economic relationship. 
<Table 6>  
Table 6 reports the elasticity of the probability of choosing alternative land uses with 
respect to the net return to land use (including own and cross elasticities). Crop and forest use 
have  positive  own-return  ealsticities  while  pasture  has  negative  elasticity,  although  the 
coefficient is not statically significant. That the latter is not responsive to net return  shows that 
conversion to pasture is determined by other factors rather than economic benefit consideration.  
The cross elasticities are not always negative. The increase in net return to pasture may also 
promote  land  conversion  to  cropland.  The  elasticities  with  respect  to  forest  net  returns  are 
especially important for our simulation model of land use. The elasticity with respect to forest 
net returns is positive and significantly different from zero. In addition, forest net return increase 
also helps land conversion to pasture.  
 
Simulation Model of Land Use 
Using the estimated coefficients for the land use choice model, we simulate agricultural land use 
changes under two suggested policies. The policies involve a subsidy for the conversion of land 14 
 
to forest and a tax on the conversion of land out of forest
5. We simulate two policy scenarios and 
examine the land use change. We specify the level of the subs idy and tax, denoted Z in two 
scenarios:  
    for land moving into forest, give the subsidy Z 
    for land moving out of forest, give the tax Z. 
Initial simulations are  run based on the values of t he models‘ independent variables in 
2007  in  order  to  generate  the  baseline  probabilities  of  choosing  each  alternative.  Using  the 
baseline  probabilities,  we  calculate  the  aggregate  acreage  of  alternative  land  uses  using  the 
following equation: 
 
Where  is the aggregate acreage of alternative k, Prob(k) is the probability of choosing k at 
point  j,  xfact  is  the  acreage  of  point  j  in  the  1997  NRI.  Once  the  baseline  simulations  are 
performed, the effect of policies at each NRI site is evaluated. With an increase in the return 
from alternative uses, we re-estimate the probability of land use at each NRI site. Finally, based 
on the re-estimated probabilities, the aggregate CRP acreage after a policy change is calculated. 
<Table 7> 
<Table 8> 
Table 7 presents the simulated effect of the subsidy to forestland on land use acreage 
after exiting the CRP. Overall, farmers are quite responsive to this policy. Although the acreage 
responses are inelastic with  rates less than $40 per acre,  the CRP acreage adjusts  relatively 
rapidly when the rental rate rises to more than $40 per acre. It should be noted that all land 15 
 
converted  to  forest  is  from  cropland.  Furthermore,  the  policy  initiative  has  spillover  effect. 
Pastureland acreages also increase simultaneously in response to the higher level of forest rent. 
In contrast to forest elastic acreage responses, its growth rate increases by only 9% and 10%, but 
the increase is substantial in amount. The spillover effect makes the policy not cost-effective as 
expected. Table 8 shows the simulated effect of the tax to land use out of forest on land use 
choice.  From  the  simulation,  tax  reduces  crop  acreages  while  increasing  pasture  and  forest 
acreages. However, the changes are not so significant compared to those in the subsidy scenario. 
Alike, the acreage reductions of cropland are absorbed by a simultaneous expansion of pasture 
and forestland. That is, spillover effect still exists, but the degree is not strong as the former.  
 
Conclusion 
The primary objective of this study is to evaluate the effect of policies supporting cellulosic 
forest biomass production on agricultural land use choice when these lands exit the CRP.  
The objective is achieved by estimating a nested logit model that based on a behavioral model of 
optimal land allocation and using the estimated coefficients to predict land use choice. Results 
show that land use choice is responsive to crop net return, but not sensitive to pasture rent and 
forest  rent.  Policy  simulation  results  suggest  that  subsidizing  conversion  to  forestland  after 
exiting the CRP can significantly increase acreages devoted to forest, but it also has spillover 
effect. Finally, the results show that a tax to land out of forest has limited impacts.  16 
 
                                                           
1 In order to reduce the number of contracts expiring, USDA offered holders of general signup 
contracts set between 2007 and 2010 (28 million acres) the opportunity to re-enroll or extend 
their contracts in 2006 (USDA/FAS 2006).  
2 In the 1997 NRI, land cover practices are classified into three categories: grasses and legumes, 
trees, and wildlife and components. 
3 Here  pasture  land  include s  pasture  and  rangeland,  even  if  the  two  type s  are  separately 
summarized in the NRI documents , we integrate them into a type  because  of their  similar 
requirement for land quality. 
4 Universal Soil Loss Equation (USLE) is an erosion model des igned to predict long -term 
average annual soil loss (due to sheet and rill erosion) from sp ecific field areas in specified 
cropping and management systems. 
5 We do not directly subsidize the forest biomass production because the market about cellulosic 
biomass market has not been established under the environment that the cellulosic ethanol 
technology is not mature.  17 
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Figure 1: ACRES EXPIRING FROM CRP THROUGH 2015


































Table.1 Summary Statistics for Land Exiting the CRP in 1992-97 
CRP Cover Practices  # of Points(percentage)  Acres (percentage) 
Grasses and Legumes  2,471(89.7%)  3,287,000(91.9%) 
Trees  198(7.2%)  207,200(5.8%) 
Wildlife and Components  87(3.1%)  83,000(2.3%) 
Total  2,756(100%)  3,577,200(100%) 





Table. 2  Land Use Alternatives after Exiting the CRP in 1997 
Land Use   #of Points  Percentage  Acres  Percentage 
Cropland  1600  58.06%  2250800  62.92% 
Pastureland  737  26.74%  796600  22.27% 
Rangeland  166  6.02%  297200  8.31% 
Forestland  203  7.37%  184400  5.15% 
Others  50  1.81%  48200  1.35% 
total  2756  100.00%  3577200  100.00% 
Note: cropland contains cultivated and non-cultivated cropland. Others contain urban and build-
up land, rural transportation land, small water areas, and other rural land. The data derived from 




Table. 3 land Characteristics according to Land Use Categories 
 
    Mean  St. De.  Min.  Max. 
Crop  LCC  3.19  1.25  1.00  8.00 
  Slope  5.15  4.49  0.10  31.00 
  CRP Cover  1.06  0.30  1.00  3.00 
Pasture  LCC  3.58  1.41  1.00  8.00 
  Slope  5.07  5.31  0.10  40.00 
  CRP Cover  1.06  0.28  1.00  3.00 
Forest  LCC  2.96  1.21  1.00  7.00 
  Slope  4.29  2.91  0.40  18.00 
  CRP Cover  2.09  0.57  1.00  3.00 





Table. 4 Summary Statistics of County-level Land net return to Alternatives 
  Net Return($/acre) 
Land Use   Mean  St. De.  Min  Max 
Cropland  57.59  33.79  21.60  218.00 
Pasture  26.33  23.42  0.03  99.81 
Forestland  16.96  19.76  0.06  100.00 
 24 
 
Table 5. Nested Logit Results for Land-Use Choice Model, 1992-1997 
Explanatory Variables  Co.  St. De.  p-value 
Crop return×  Slope  -0.001  0.000  0.058 
Crop return×  LCC  0.002  0.002  0.186 
Crop return×  Cover  0.029  0.009  0.001 
Pasture return× Slope  0.000  0.000  0.644 
Pasture return× LCC  0.002  0.002  0.143 
Pasture return× Slope  -0.001  0.007  0.924 
Forest return× Slope  0.001  0.001  0.177 
Forest return× LCC  -0.002  0.002  0.352 
Forest return× Cover  -0.007  0.007  0.312 
Net forest return  0.010  0.010  0.354 
Net pasture return  -0.012  0.010  0.206 
Net crop return  -0.038  0.011  0.001 
Slope(Pasture)  0.031  0.032  0.327 
LCC(Pasture)  0.102  0.104  0.329 
Cover(Pasture)  -1.205  0.438  0.006 
Pasture Constant  0.466  0.581  0.423 
Slope(Forest)  -2376.360  772.858  0.002 
Slope(Forest)  -9.943  5.875  0.091 
Cover(Forest)  183.810  55.047  0.001 
Forest Constant  -215.203  64.734  0.001 25 
 
Inclusive  value 
para.(crop)  1.000   
 
Inclusive  value  para. 







Table 6. Land-Use Choice Elasticity 
Land Use  Crop return  Pasture return  Forest return 
Crop  0.792***  0.133  -0.008 
  (0.256)  (0.095)  (0.060) 
Pasture  -1.253***  -0.211  0.013 
  (0.360)  （0.152）  （0.095） 
Forest  -0.237  -0.001  0.035 
  (3.0839)  (1.2293)  (1.3959) 









Table 7. The simulated effect of the subsidy to forest on agricultural land use 
Subsidy($/acre)  Crop  Pasture  Forest 
10  2024329  1239450  211636 
20  2020728  1275990  225813 
40  2013526  1349069  254167 
80  1999122  1495228  310875 





Table 8. The simulated effect of the tax to land use out of forest on land use choice 
Subsidy($/acre)  Crop  Pasture  Forest 
10  2011311  1217822  197748 
20  2000712  1226682  197934 
40  1990307  1237657  198162 
80  1985792  1244937  198512 












The net return per acre cropland is composed of net cash return from agricultural sales and 
received government payment. Information on net cash return and government payment in each 
county in 1997 is from Agricultural Resources and Environmental Indicators (AREI) Database. 
County-level  cropland  acreage  is  from  the  National  Agricultural  Statistics  Service  (NASS), 
USDA. Pasture net returns per acre are proxied by net cash rent for pastureland and rangeland. 
The  Census  of  Agriculture  provides  county-level  cash  grazing  rent  amounts,  while  pasture 
acreage in each county is from NASS. Forest net returns are from USDA Forest Services (NFS). 
 